Our work mainly focuses on the theory of Legal Argumentation, Constitutionalism, Democracy, Constitutional State, Philosophical Questions of Constitutional Law and Human Rights, Global Justice, Social Power and Economic Order, Norm Theories, Basic Rights Theories, Legal Logic, Legal Gender Studies.
Graz Jurisprudence cultivates an agile research culture. We see scholarship as a form of life (Lebensform) in which research is constantly expected, produced, discussed, and valued. Research is more important to us than other tasks. Graz Jurisprudence facilitates high quality research in a creative, productive, and nurturing work environment. We provide to our visiting scholars a temporary home for their research stays. And we invite outstanding students to profit from our research culture early on during their studies, e.g. by participating in our Privatissimum or joining us as a member of our student staff.
We have two main research areas:
Legal Philosophy in the wider sense designates the philosophical theory of law and legal scholarship. Legal Philosophy has a dual nature: On the one hand, it is a foundational discipline of law. On the other hand, it is a special discipline of philosophy. Hence, Legal Philosophy is interdisciplinary per se. Legal Philosophy in the wider sense is nowadays often referred to as Jurisprudence. That's where our name originates from.
Global Constitutionalism is an evolving new area. We focus on the similarities and differences among all levels of constitutional law (national, supranational, and international), adopting a universalizing, transnationalizing and comparative perspective.
Both main areas are divided into three sub-areas respectively. In result, we focus on six research areas:
1. We mainly engage in fundamental research: We investigate predominantly universal structures and problems which transcend questions of application in concrete legal systems, in accordance with the ideal of a purpose-free pursuit of knowledge for its own ends.
2. Supplemental, we attend to more specific, practice-related questions of applying the law. This is true, in particular, for our analyses of case law and problems of legal argumentation.
3. Our research methods are primarily analytical and normative. This distinguishes us from empirical legal research and from the so-called dogmatic legal disciplines. However, we aim at integrating empirical and dogmatic knowledge into our research. We thus follow a holistic ideal of methodological completeness.
4. We participate first and foremost in international debates.